01359     2200277   4500001002100000005001500021035002000036008004100056020001800097041000800115082000800123084001400131100001800145245005400163260003200217300002900249500002300278520061600301650001400917990002500931990002500956990002500981990002501006990002501031990002501056INLIS00000000000337120221107091231  a0010-0520003371221107                |          | eng    a9780521713368  aeng  a347  a347 DUX n0 aDuxbury, Neil14aNature and Authority of Precedent /cNeil Duxbury  aCambridge :bThomson,c2008  axv,189p.; 23cm. ;c23cm.  aIndeks : p.184-189  aThis book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that, although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judical decisions on mterially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judical precedents not 'bind' judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. It will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine. 4aPrecedent  a09839/MKRI-P/XI-2008  a09840/MKRI-P/XI-2008  a09839/MKRI-P/XI-2008  a09840/MKRI-P/XI-2008  a09840/MKRI-P/XI-2008  a09839/MKRI-P/XI-2008