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Judul Justice In Robes / Ronald Dworkin
Pengarang Dworkin, Ronald
EDISI 1
Penerbitan London : Hadvard University Press, 2006
Deskripsi Fisik 308 p. ; 24cm ;24cm
ISBN 0-6740-2167-3
Subjek 1. Judicial Process-Philosophy
2. Law-Interpretation and Construction
3. Law and Ethics
Abstrak This book provide summarizes the author own widely discussed account of these connections, which emphasizes the sovereign importance of moral principle in legal and constitutional interpretation, and then reviews and criticized the most influential rival theories to his own. The author argues that pragmatism is empty as a theory of law, that value pluralism misunderstands the nature of moral concepts, that constitutional originalsm reflects an impoverished view of the role of a constitution in a democratic society, and that contemporary legal positivism is based on a mistaken semantic theory and an erroneous account of the nature of authority.
Catatan Indeks : Index
Bahasa Inggris
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Target Pembaca Tidak ada kode yang sesuai

 
No Barcode No. Panggil Akses Lokasi Ketersediaan
00000007583 340.112/DWO/J Dapat dipinjam Perpustakaan Lantai 3 - Mahkamah Konstitusi RI Tersedia
pesan
00000005821 340.112 DWO j Dapat dipinjam Perpustakaan Lantai 3 - Mahkamah Konstitusi RI Tersedia
pesan
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500 # # $a Indeks : Index
520 # # $a This book provide summarizes the author own widely discussed account of these connections, which emphasizes the sovereign importance of moral principle in legal and constitutional interpretation, and then reviews and criticized the most influential rival theories to his own. The author argues that pragmatism is empty as a theory of law, that value pluralism misunderstands the nature of moral concepts, that constitutional originalsm reflects an impoverished view of the role of a constitution in a democratic society, and that contemporary legal positivism is based on a mistaken semantic theory and an erroneous account of the nature of authority.
650 4 $a 1. Judicial Process-Philosophy
650 4 $a 2. Law-Interpretation and Construction
650 4 $a 3. Law and Ethics
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990 # # $a 07583/MKRI-P/XII-2007
Content Unduh katalog