Nature and Authority of Precedent / Neil Duxbury | Perpustakaan Mahkamah Konstitusi

Judul	Nature and Authority of Precedent / Neil Duxbury
Pengarang	Duxbury, Neil
Penerbitan	Cambridge : Thomson, 2008
Deskripsi Fisik	xv,189p.; 23cm. ;23cm.
ISBN	9780521713368
Subjek	Precedent
Abstrak	This book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that, although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judical decisions on mterially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judical precedents not 'bind' judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. It will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine.
Catatan	Indeks : p.184-189
Bahasa	Inggris
Bentuk Karya	Tidak ada kode yang sesuai
Target Pembaca	Tidak ada kode yang sesuai

No Barcode	No. Panggil	Akses	Lokasi	Ketersediaan
00000009839	347 DUX n	Dapat dipinjam	Perpustakaan Lantai 3 - Mahkamah Konstitusi RI	Tersedia pesan
00000009840	347 DUX n	Dapat dipinjam	Perpustakaan Lantai 3 - Mahkamah Konstitusi RI	Tersedia pesan

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