1. Teori Hukum

Indeks : Indeks ; Religious liberty was, as Joseph Raz has observed, at the cradle of liberlism and surely stands as the liberal tradition's premier achievement. But what are is grounds? Does principled belief in freedom of religion presuppose or entail religious indifferentism or even the nonexixtence of religious truth? Does it require the 'privatization' of religion and the exclusion of religiously informed moral judgment from public life? I think not. In chapter seven, "Religious liberty and political morality, ' Idefend conception of religious liberty that is rooted in appreciation of the nature of religion as a basic human good. I offer a natural law theory of religious freedom as an alternative to the more familiar liberal conceptions. I note, however, an important similarity between my natural law argument for religious freedom and the Lockean liberal approach to the subject. Central to both approaches is a recognition of the fact that religious faith, by its nature, cannot be coerced. If the good of religion is to be realized in the life of the believer, it must be by his free assent of mind and will to the truthsof faith. It is not so much wrong to coerce faith as it is impossible. The price of attempted coercion is religious inauthenticity, at best. I argue, however, that from this fact it is a mistake to conclude, as many contemporary liberals do, that political authority must, in effect, profess agnoticism and concern itself not at all with people's religious or spiritual well-being. It is an even worse mistake to suppose, as some liberals do, that it is illegitimate for people to act on religious motivations in the creation of law and formulation of public policy with respect to important issues of justice and human rights.